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Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa are confronted with the need to
raise tax revenues so they are able to provide a range of services to their
populations. In the context of the Millennium Development Goals, the
levels of need in such areas as poverty reduction, education, health care,
and access to basic infrastructure services are extremely high, and the
ability to finance provision of those services cannot rely solely or too ex-
tensively on limited foreign aid. Therefore, tax revenues are required, and
it is in the countries with the lowest levels of per capita gross domestic
product (GDP)—and so the highest need—that tax and other government
revenues as a proportion of GDP are the lowest. In addition, because of
the high level of informality in their economies, very-low-income coun-
tries obtain a large share of tax revenues through consumption-related
taxes (such as the value-added tax [VAT] or taxes on imports), which also
tend to be more regressive than the taxes on incomes that are levied in
richer countries.
Such a situation poses a difficult dilemma. Very-low-income countries
are trying to increase their tax revenues to provide services to their popu-
lations in need; but, because much of the taxation is based on household
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consumption, part of the burden of increased taxes falls on the consump-
tion of poor people. Furthermore, because the poor in very-low-income
countries are really extremely poor, even small increases in the price of
the goods they consume related to an increase in the taxation rates on
those goods may have important negative implications for households’
ability to meet their basic needs.
This dilemma is illustrated in the case of Niger, one of the poorest
countries on earth. Among the eight countries belonging to the West
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), Niger has the lowest
ratio of government revenues to GDP. The WAEMU countries share a
common currency, the CFA franc. To maintain price stability and pro-
mote economic growth, these countries are required to follow eight con-
vergence criteria, as presented in table 11.1.
The convergence criteria are defined in the following terms: (1) budget
deficit as a share of GDP (there should be no budget deficit); (2) infla-
tion rate (it should be below 3 percent per year); (3) public debt-to-GDP
ratio (it should be below 70 percent so as not to have debt-service obliga-
tions that are difficult to honor); (4) debt arrears (there should be no such
arrears, domestically or externally); (5) public wage bill as a share of GDP
(it should not be above 35 percent so as to not impose too high a burden
on the budget); (6) share of tax revenues used for domestic-funded invest-
ment (it should not be below 20 percent, so as not to depend only on
donor funding for such investments); (7) trade deficit-to-GDP ratio (the
maximum allowable trade deficit is 5 percent of GDP); and (8) tax 
revenue-to-GDP ratio (it should be at or above 17 percent, so as to en-
able governments to use tax revenues to provide basic services and im-
prove the well-being of the population). As shown in table 11.1, in 2005
Niger’s tax revenues as a share of GDP were only 11.3 percent, versus
14.0 percent to 19.0 percent in most other countries in the union (except
Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau, which also had very low tax revenue-to-
GDP ratios). The target level for the tax revenues-to-GDP ratio in the
WAEMU zone is 17 percent.
In this chapter, our objective is to demonstrate how to use very simple
techniques of tax incidence analysis to analyze the potential impact on
the poor of indirect tax reforms, or at least to shed light on these issues,
with an application to Niger.1 The techniques used here are similar to
those employed for benefit incidence analysis (see chapter 4). As noted
by Demery (2003),2 benefit incidence analysis typically is obtained by
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combining data on the use of government services from household sur-
veys with data on the cost of providing those services from government
budgets. Benefit incidence analysis involves three steps. First, the unit cost
of providing a particular service is estimated using government budget
data. Second, household survey data are used to allocate the benefits of
public spending for specific services to the households using those servic-
es. Third, the data at the household level are aggregated into benefit inci-
dence statistics for subgroups of the population to compare how the sub-
sidy is distributed across those groups. The most common way to group
households is on the basis of indicators such as income or consumption
per capita or per equivalent adult, often according to quintiles. On the ba-
sis of comparisons of the incidence of public spending by quintile, sugges-
tions are then made regarding the possibility of reorienting public spend-
ing to allocate a larger share of it to the poor (that is, in most cases, to
households in the bottom two or three quintiles.) 
Here we follow the same approach for tax incidence. As for benefit in-
cidence, we combine data on household consumption with data on the
taxes levied by the state on various consumption goods. The empirical es-
timation also involves three steps. First, the tax rates on particular goods
and services are obtained from administrative information about the tax
system. Second, household survey data are used to allocate the taxes paid
for specific goods and services to the households consuming those goods
and services.Third, the data at the household level are aggregated into tax
incidence statistics for subgroups of the population to compare how the
taxes are distributed across those groups. The results obtained for tax in-
cidence are then compared with those for the benefit incidence of public
spending in the social sectors to get an idea of an overall tax and spending
package’s impact on the poor. Although there are important caveats to
the conclusions that can be reached with such simple techniques, the re-
sults are potentially useful for informing policy.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section first
provides a review of medium-term targets for generating public revenues
in Niger, and a description of the current structure of tax revenues. In the
third section, we rely on household surveys data to assess the potential dis-
tributional incidence of selected reforms that were under consideration in
the country in 2004 and early 2005. In the fourth section, we briefly show
how the overall effect of any tax reform partly depends on how new tax
revenues are spent. A brief conclusion completes the chapter.
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Medium-Term Targets for Public Revenues and 
Structure of Taxation 
Niger’s fiscal performance has improved since 2000, owing to the imple-
mentation of fiscal adjustment policies and an improvement in public fi-
nances. Policies were aimed at ensuring a sustainable fiscal position and
complying gradually with the above-mentioned convergence criteria of
the WAEMU. On the revenue side, revenue increased from 8.6 percent of
GDP in 2000 to 9.9 percent in 2003. On the expenditure side, current
expenditure declined as a share of GDP during the same period. Capital
expenditure increased by about 1.6 percentage points of GDP—from 5.7
percent of GDP to 7.3 percent, in line with the implementation of the
poverty reduction strategy and supported in part by resources freed by
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.
The overall budget deficit (on a commitment basis, excluding official
budgetary grants), which stood at an annual average of 9.0 percent in the
previous two years, declined to 7.7 percent a year between 2001 and
2003. The primary budget deficit was reduced by 1.0 percentage point of
GDP—from 3.0 percent of GDP in 2000 to 2.0 percent in 2003. In addi-
tion, the government has made efforts to clear domestic arrears. Imple-
menting the reform program enabled Niger to reach the completion
point under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative on April 12, 2004, and to re-
ceive additional debt relief (topping-up) in the amount of $142 million.
After three years of implementation of the program covering the period
from 2000 to 2003, the sixth Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility re-
view and the ex post assessment of performance under the International
Monetary Fund (IMF)-supported program concluded that economic and
financial management during this period was appropriate for macroeco-
nomic stability and poverty reduction.
The macroeconomic framework for 2005–07 in table 11.2 calls for an
increase in domestic revenue mobilization. Under scenarios discussed be-
tween the World Bank and the IMF, real GDP growth would increase by
an annual average of 4.2 percent throughout the period 2005–07. This
growth would be supported by an increase in investment and a strength-
ening of nonmining activities (agriculture and services), new gold mining
activities, and improvements in the economic policies of Niger’s regional
partners (especially Nigeria). Gross investment would increase from an
estimated 15.9 percent of GDP in 2004 to 17.3 percent in 2007. Gross
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national savings would increase by 1.3 percentage points of GDP—from
an estimated 10.0 percent of GDP in 2004 to 11.3 percent of GDP in
2007—as a result of increases in public and private savings. Annual average
inflation would remain contained at 2.1 percent during 2005–07, reflecting
prudent monetary policy at the regional level, a stable real exchange rate,
and strong and sustainable economic growth. Taking into account the fi-
nancing prospects and the need to ensure debt sustainability, the overall
fiscal deficit (on a commitment basis and excluding budgetary grants)
would decline from an estimated 7.6 percent of GDP to 6.5 percent by
2007. To this end, fiscal policy would aim at ensuring continued reduc-
tion in fiscal deficits through improved expenditure management and
measures to boost revenue collection, with government revenue reaching
11.6 percent of GDP over the period 2005–07.
To understand how this increase in tax revenues could be achieved, it is
useful to review Niger’s tax system briefly. The rate of public revenue mo-
bilization in Niger, which reached 14 percent of GDP in 1980 (at a time
when uranium exports were larger), has hovered around the 10.0 percent
mark in recent years, with a slight improvement in 2003 to 10.7 percent
of GDP. This rate is the lowest among WAEMU member-countries, well
350 Public Finance for Poverty Reduction
Table 11.2. Recent Economic Performance and Medium-Term Macroeconomic
Framework, 1997–2007
Macroeconomic Indicator 1997–99 2000–03 2004 2005–07
Growth, investment and savings
Real GDP growth (%) 4.2 3.5 0.9 4.2
Primary 8.0 3.2 — —
Secondary 2.3 2.4 — —
Tertiary 3.3 4.0 — —
Gross investment (% of GDP) 11.1 13.0 15.9 17.3
Public finance
Government revenue (% of GDP) 8.8 9.6 10.5 11.6
Government expenditure (% of GDP) 17.3 17.4 18.2 18.8
Primary balance (% of GDP) –7.0 –6.3 –7.0 –6.6
Overall balance (% of GDP) –8.5 –7.8 –7.6 –7.2
External debt
Debt service-to-export ratio (before 20.3 26.8 12.3 9.7
debt relief, %)
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on World Bank and International Monetary Fund data.
Note: — = not available; GDP = gross domestic product.
(c) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
below the WAEMU average of about 15.0 percent and its target rate of
17.0 percent. According to IMF data, the main taxes are as follows:
• Direct taxes: These taxes account for roughly 15–16 percent of total
tax revenues and comprise mainly taxes on industrial and commercial
profits (bénéfices industriels et commerciaux [BIC], for 9 percent of to-
tal revenues), and taxes on wages and salaries (impôts sur les traite-
ments, salaires et revenus assimiles, for 5 percent of total revenues). The
BIC tax rate currently stands at 35 percent and is levied on commer-
cial, noncommercial, agricultural, and other formal sector activities.
There is also a flat 1 percent tax (impôt minimum forfaitaire) levied on
total revenues (chiffre d’affaires) but deductible from the BIC tax. The
personal income tax is a progressive tax levied on wages and salaries,
with a maximum marginal rate of 45 percent, after various deductions,
including deductions for family dependents.
• Import taxes: Since 2000, Niger has applied the WAEMU tariff exterieur
commun (TEC) on imports originating outside of WAEMU countries.
The TEC includes both permanent and temporary taxes, whose rates
vary depending on the types of goods. Permanent taxes comprise the
droit de douane (at a rate of 0 to 20 percent depending on goods), the
redevance statistique (at a rate of 1 percent), and the prélèvement com-
pensatoire de solidarité (also at a rate of 1 percent). Temporary taxes al-
lowed by WAEMU include the taxe dégressive de protection (TDP) and
the taxe conjoncturelle à l’importation (TCI). The TDP was put in place
for a temporary period of four years (2000–03, with a one-year exten-
sion) for certain industrial or agroindustrial products to compensate
for important reductions in tariff protection linked to the implemen-
tation of the TEC. The TCI aims to compensate agricultural, agroin-
dustrial, cattle, and fisheries (excluding fish) products for important
reductions in tariff protection resulting from variations in world prices.
Although Niger does not apply the TDP, rice imports were subjected
to the TCI until 2003. Imports also are subject to indirect taxes im-
posed on domestic products (including excise taxes imposed ad val-
orem on tobacco, cigarettes, alcoholic drinks, coffee, cola nuts, cosmet-
ics, vegetable oils, and petroleum products), and to the 19 percent
VAT. Imports originating from WAEMU member-countries are subject
only to domestic taxes. At customs, a downpayment on industrial and
commercial profits (the BIC) is collected for the Droit General d’Im-
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portation at the rate of 3 percent if the importer is matriculated and 
5 percent otherwise. Overall, import taxes represent approximately 
20 percent of tax revenues.
• Export taxes: In 1996 the redevance statistique tax base, which was al-
ready in place for Niger’s imports, was expanded to encompass exports
at the rate of 5 percent and subsequently reduced to 3 percent. Exports
in transit to Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria—exports called “transit spe-
cial”—are subject to a taxe spéciale de réexportation at a normal rate of 
5 percent, increased to 10 percent on cigarettes reexported to Nigeria,
and to 15 percent on cigarettes reexported toward Algeria and Libya.
On average, total revenues from export taxation represent 10–11 per-
cent of tax revenues.
• Value-added tax: The VAT has been levied at a unique rate of 19 per-
cent since 2001—an amount just below the upper limit of the interval
in the WAEMU VAT Directive (16–20 percent). In 2002, VAT receipts
accounted for 32 percent of total tax revenues. Despite a more efficient
administration and progress in the receipts of this tax, this tax repre-
sented only 3.2 percent of GDP, well below the average among WAE-
MU members (5–7 percent of GDP). The VAT efficiency rate (VAT re-
ceipts as a share of GDP divided by the VAT tax rate) was 17.9 percent
in 2002, versus an average of 27.0 percent in sub-Saharan Africa. If the
VAT efficiency rate were brought up to 27.0 percent, public revenues
would increase by 1.7 percent of GDP.The shortfall in VAT collections
in Niger is due in part to exemptions but, more important, to a high
level of informality, including high levels of autoconsumption, and to
weaknesses in tax administration.
• Other taxes: Excise taxes account for slightly less than 8 percent of to-
tal tax revenues (of which slightly less than 1 percent comes from al-
coholic beverages and 3 percent comes from tobacco products). Be-
cause Niger’s excise tax rates are already in the upper limit of the
WAEMU Directive, no further increases in these tax rates can be con-
templated. However, additional categories of goods might be taxed, in-
cluding sodas, sugar-sweetened drinks, and tea. It has been suggested
that the excise tax on vegetable oils be eliminated (and that these oils
be subjected instead to the VAT) to improve the competitiveness of
firms using vegetable oils as inputs. Finally, all other taxes combined
account for about 13 percent of total tax receipts.This combination in-
cludes the redevance minière, which itself represents 5 percent of total
revenues.
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Assessing the Impact of Indirect Tax Reforms:
VAT Exemptions
Government proposals regarding VAT reforms that were discussed in
2004–05 were focused largely on final consumption products exempted
from the VAT. The list of exempted products in 2004 included grains oth-
er than rice, inputs bought or imported for the purposes of an industrial
installation established in Niger, computer equipment purchased for tech-
nical or professional education establishments, health and education prod-
ucts, agricultural inputs, road transport of people and merchandise, and
household consumption of water and electricity for a monthly total of less
than 50 m3 of water and 150 kWh of electricity. In addition, the invest-
ment code, agreements with certain companies and nongovernmental or-
ganizations, and certain externally financed projects also allow numerous
exemptions from the VAT.
For example, as an investment incentive in the agricultural sector, the
investment code exempts agropastoral outputs, including outputs of in-
dustrial agriculture; the processing of vegetable or animal goods and pro-
duction for the purpose of exporting agricultural products; and livestock
and fisheries products. Because it is difficult to increase VAT collections
by reducing autoconsumption or reducing the size of the informal sector,
an alternative means of generating higher VAT collections is to limit the
number of exemptions.
Among the reforms in this area that were considered in 2004–05 were
(1) imposing an excise tax at the rate of 5 percent on sodas and sugar-
sweetened drinks, which could raise an additional CFAF 0.1 billion;
(2) imposing an excise tax at the rate of 12 percent on tea, which could
increase revenues by CFAF 0.4 billion; (3) eliminating the excise tax on
vegetable oil and replacing it with the VAT; (4) eliminating the tranches
sociales exemption from the VAT, defined with respect to household con-
sumption of water and electricity, which could add CFAC 1.6 billion (es-
pecially through electricity consumption); and (5) subjecting processed
food products (mainly milk, flour, sugar, and the like) to the VAT, which
could raise an additional CFAF 1.3, 1.9, and 1.6 billion on milk, flour, and
sugar, respectively. All proposals and estimated amounts of tax revenues
to be generated above are indicative only, and many of the proposed
goods for taxation have remained exempt.
Household survey data can be used to assess the tax potential of vari-
ous commodities, as well as the incidence of the tax burden. This section
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analyzes the potential effects of the past proposals for VAT reform on
poverty and inequality, using consumption data in household surveys. For
Niamey, the capital of Niger, we rely on the 1-2-3 survey3 implemented
in 2004, which includes a detailed consumption module. For the country
as a whole, we rely on the 1995 Economic and Social Conjuncture Sur-
vey (EPCES) data, which include Niamey in its sampling frame. As dis-
cussed below, the aggregate statistics obtained from the household sur-
veys and presented in table 11.3 suggest, despite issues regarding data
quality, that we can make the case that the analysis of the proposed re-
forms’ potential impact on poverty and inequality can be conducted with
reasonable confidence.
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Table 11.3. Aggregate Statistics on Consumption Categories Targeted for 
Indirect Taxation
Niamey Niamey Niger Niger
Consumption category 1994–95 2004 1994–95 2003–04
National accounts
GDP per capita (million — — 867,900 1,586,500
constant CFA) 
Household consumption — — 728,960 1,326,100
(million constant CFA) 
Share of consumption in GDP (%) — — 83.99 83.59
Survey consumption estimate 59,076 272,389 752,277 —
(million CFA) 
Population, Niamey survey 410,517 797,920 — —
(number of persons)
Population, Niger survey/ 8,762,875 11,692,179 — —
United Nations (number of 
persons)
Share of population in 4.68 6.82 — —
Niamey (%)
Share of consumption in 8.10 20.54 — —
Niamey (%)
Household spending in  survey (million CFA)
Electricity 987 6,828 1,828 —
Water (private connections) 358 1,139 847 —
Oil 1,762 7,159 19,690 —
Flour — 2,073 — 7,585–8,035
Milk — 1,489 — 7,512–7,951
Sugar — 1,405 — 16,580–11,497
Condiments 5,830 — 43,252 —
(c) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
Aggregate Statistics 
Consider first key parameters from the 1995 national survey (table 11.3).
Total consumption as measured in the survey using the expansion factors
is CFAF 752.277 billion, which is very close to the national accounts val-
ue of CFAF 728.960 billion. In Niamey, however, the aggregate con-
sumption estimates for 1995 are too low. In 1995, Niamey apparently
had a consumption share of only 8.10 percent for a population share of
4.68 percent, which implies an average per capita consumption level in
Niamey at less than twice the national aggregate. In the 2004 survey, Ni-
amey’s consumption share (versus the national accounts estimate) was
much higher at 20.54 percent for a population share of 6.82 percent (also
higher because of migration). This finding suggests for 2004 a level of per
capita consumption in Niamey about three times higher than in the
country as a whole, which is probably more realistic. The aggregates in
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Table 11.3, continued
Niamey Niamey Niger Niger
Consumption category 1994–95 2004 1994–95 2003–04
Tea — 674 — —
Sodas — 251 — —
All categories above as 15.13 7.72 8.72 —
percent of total 
consumption (%)
Potential tax revenues (million CFA)
Electricity — 1,197 — 542–1,600
Water — 442 — Low to 307 
Oil — +1,360/ — Low
–1,074
Flour — 394 — 500
Milk — 283 — 495–1,300
Sugar — 267 — 665–1,600
Condiments — n.a. — —
Tea — 81 — 400
Sodas — 13 — 100
Total potential tax revenues — 0.93 — —
as percent of total 
consumption (%)
Source: Authors’ estimates. The first three columns in the table are estimates based on household surveys; the
last column is based on administrative data.
Note: — = not available; CFA = Niger franc; GDP = gross domestic product; n.a. = not applicable. All values in
millions of CFA.
(c) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
table 11.3 show that it is better for Niamey to use the data from 2004,
not only because the data are more recent and detailed, but also because
they are of higher quality (not surprising, given the higher level of detail
in the 2004 questionnaire than in the 1995 questionnaire).
Consumption by Category of Goods
The data in the 1995 survey enable us to look at the consumption distri-
bution of a subset of goods (oils, condiments, piped water, and electrici-
ty). The data in the 2004 Niamey survey are more detailed, so we have
information as well on the consumption of flour, milk, sugar, tea, and so-
das. A key finding in both the Niamey 2004 survey and the national 1995
survey is that the goods selected for taxation represent 8–9 percent of to-
tal consumption. In the Niamey subsample for 1995, the proportion is
higher (15 percent), but that is likely to be overestimated because, as dis-
cussed above, total consumption in the Niamey subsample for that year
seems to be underestimated. Now, if the goods targeted for taxation rep-
resent roughly 8–9 percent of total consumption, we can assume that ad-
ditional taxes imposed on households through a reduction in exemptions
for those goods should be around 2 percent of total consumption. That
assumption seems valid because the VAT rate is at 19 percent, and some
of the proposals under consideration call for lower (for example, excise)
tax rates on the targeted goods. Still, for some households the burden of
additional taxes would be much higher than the average of 2 percent. For
those households, the increase in taxation is cause for concern.
Tax Revenues by Category of Goods
Table 11.3 finally provides estimates of the tax revenues that could be ex-
pected from various goods in the Niamey 2004 survey, as well as the tax
revenues anticipated in various government estimates. Electricity and
packaged foods would bring in the largest revenues if these goods were
taxed, followed by water consumption, tea, and sodas.There are some dif-
ferences between the survey estimates and the government’s estimates
(and the latter may be more precise because they rely on data from cus-
toms for imported goods); overall, however, the orders of magnitude
seem correct, and Niamey as well as other urban areas are likely to ac-
count for a relatively large share of the total tax revenues to be generated.
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The shares of new taxes paid by poor or vulnerable households are
similar in the 1995 and 2004 surveys and could reach 40 percent for
some goods. Table 11.4 provides estimates of consumption shares for
various goods by decile, and thereby estimates the shares of taxes that
would be paid by households according to their per capita consumption
of those goods. On the basis of poverty statistics from the mid-1990s and
projections-based growth in GDP per capita, we assume that, at the na-
tional level, at least 60 percent of the population is poor—versus, say,
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Table 11.4. Consumption Shares of Comparable Goods by Income Decile,
1995 and 2004 Surveys
Cumulative share of consumption (%)
Condiments
and targeted
packaged Vegetable Total
Consuming group food a oils Electricity Water consumption
Niger, 1994–95
Decile 1 (poorest) 1.15 0.67 0.14 0.37 1.06
Decile 2 3.21 2.59 1.06 1.46 3.04
Decile 3 5.78 5.25 1.71 2.02 5.84
Decile 4 9.56 9.10 1.81 2.04 9.59
Decile 5 14.23 13.62 2.31 3.72 14.17
Decile 6 (low poverty line) 20.06 20.29 3.72 6.88 20.01
Decile 7 27.56 28.77 7.26 10.84 27.57
Decile 8 (high poverty line) 38.19 39.29 15.66 20.40 37.89
Decile 9 53.64 56.22 28.54 31.79 52.68
Decile 10 (richest) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Niamey, 2004
Decile 1 (poorest) 0.93 3.35 1.75 1.77 2.07
Decile 2 2.89 9.43 4.66 8.99 5.73
Decile 3 6.78 14.28 6.60 19.56 10.01
Decile 4 (low poverty line) 12.02 20.17 12.50 27.39 15.34
Decile 5 17.26 26.86 17.04 31.64 21.89
Decile 6 (high poverty line) 25.75 37.52 23.85 43.72 28.86
Decile 7 38.15 49.76 35.77 53.33 37.46
Decile 8 52.85 67.46 45.69 60.75 48.11
Decile 9 70.23 76.75 59.95 73.86 62.39
Decile 10 (richest) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Authors’ estimates, based on the national 1994–95 survey and the 1-2-3 household surveys for Niamey in
2004.
a. Data on condiments come from the 1995 survey; data on packaged goods come from the 2004 survey.
(c) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
40 percent in Niamey.4 Under such an assumption, the cumulative share
of consumption of a good by (at least) the bottom six deciles at the na-
tional level, and the bottom four deciles in Niamey, would represent the
share of the taxes that will be paid by the poor. For the packaged goods
targeted for taxation (or condiments as a proxy in the 1995 survey) and
for vegetable oils, these shares vary between 12 and 20 percent, and they
are similar to the shares of total consumption accounted for by the poor
(at 20 percent nationally and 15 percent in Niamey). This finding would
suggest that 20 percent of the taxation on these goods would be paid by
the poor—provided, of course, that only 60 percent of the population is
considered poor at the national level and 40 percent in Niamey. If, in-
stead, we consider 80 percent of the country’s population to be poor, or
at least vulnerable to poverty, and the corresponding proportion for Ni-
amey to be 60 percent, then the share of the new taxes to be paid by poor
people would be much higher—close to 40 percent for many goods. This
is also the case for consumption of electricity and piped water, at least in
Niamey.5
The analysis of the more detailed information in the 2004 Niamey sur-
vey confirms that poor and vulnerable groups could pay a substantial
share of new taxes. The share of total consumption accruing to the bot-
tom four deciles in Niamey is 15.34 percent (table 11.5). For oil and
flour, the shares consumed by the poor are higher—20 percent and 25
percent, respectively. For all the other goods targeted for taxation, the
share is lower—0 percent for sodas to 14.29 percent for piped water.
Overall, when taking the sum of taxes to be paid on the various goods, the
share is very similar to the total consumption share—about 15 percent.
Now, if we consider that 60 percent of the population in Niamey is poor,
or at least vulnerable, the shares of new taxes paid by poor or vulnerable
groups increases to about 30 percent (and up to 40 percent for some
goods). Of all the categories considered for taxation, the analysis suggests
that flour would have the largest proportional negative impact on the
poor because the share of total consumption of flour is highest among the
poor. Another statistic provided in the table is the total per capita average
tax payment by decile.When the reduction in excise tax for vegetable oils
is included (to partially offset the imposition of the VAT on these oils),
the annual per capita tax payment varies from CFAF 800 in the poorest
decile to CFAF 12,710 in the richest decile. As a share of per capita con-
sumption, these tax payments are relatively similar in all deciles. Howev-
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er, it must be stressed again that this is an average and for some house-
holds the cost may be much higher. Also, given that many poor house-
holds have limited cash revenues at their disposal, the share of the tax in-
crease in their total available cash would also be higher.
Because the total value of the new taxes that were to be obtained by a re-
duction in selected VAT exemptions considered by the government was lim-
ited, the effect on poverty could have been limited as well, at least on aver-
age. However, for some households consuming the goods considered for
taxation in higher amounts, the increase in costs was probably substantial. In
addition, the proposed implementation of the measures under consideration
took place at a difficult time, after a crop year marked by a drought. There-
fore, the VAT reform measures combined with the increase in the price of
some food items (probably resulting from the lack of supply caused by the
drought) led to a rapid and substantial increase in the final consumer price
for a range of goods—and that led to protests. In their subsequent dialogue,
the government and civil society organizations agreed on a new package of
measures that enabled the country to achieve the goal of higher fiscal rev-
enues while protecting the poor from most of the impact of the tax reform
originally proposed. Interestingly and appropriately, the main good on
which the decision to apply the VAT was maintained—sugar—is also one of
the goods with a comparatively lower share of total consumption, and there-
by lower tax to be paid by the poor (tables 11.4 and 11.5).
To analyze alternatives to increases in indirect taxation, one must con-
sider ways of increasing tax revenues other than indirect taxation. As
members of WAEMU, countries such as Niger have only limited ability to
raise trade-related taxes. Given that indirect taxes, such as the VAT, tend
to be less progressive than other taxes, it is important to assess how higher
tax revenues could be obtained from direct taxes.As mentioned earlier, di-
rect taxes account today for roughly only 15–16 percent of total tax rev-
enues, a relatively low total. Data from the new, nationally representative
2005 Questionnaire des Indicateurs de Base du Bien-Etre, as well as the 
1-2-3 Niamey survey, could be used to simulate the impact of measures to
increase revenues from direct taxes. For example, some segments of the in-
formal sector could be “formalized” to raise additional tax revenues with-
out having a potentially large negative impact on the poor.
Beyond the simple analytic tools presented in this chapter, more power-
ful tools are available to analyze the potential effect of tax reforms on
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poverty. One possibility is to rely on so-called balanced budget tax reform
techniques by which tax rates are raised on goods consumed more by the
better-off population, while rates are lowered on goods typically con-
sumed more by the poor population. Beyond the simple distributional
analysis presented here, it is also feasible to conduct general equilibrium
analysis of the impact of tax reforms when a social accounting matrix and
computable general equilibrium model are available. (Such tools are un-
der construction for Niger.) Finally, apart from assessing the impact of tax
reforms on poverty, it also is essential to look at how additional tax rev-
enues are used in providing services that benefit the poor in the social
sectors and/or in implementing poverty reduction programs anchored in
the poverty reduction strategy, as illustrated with the preliminary analysis
presented in the next section.
Comparison of the Incidence of Taxation to the 
Incidence of Social Spending
A necessary but not sufficient condition for tax reforms to benefit the
poor is that the proceeds from the reform be allocated to the poverty re-
duction expenditures. Consider the case of the VAT reform mentioned
above. To assess whether such a reform would likely be pro-poor, one
must make assumptions in terms of how the new tax revenues will be
spent. If the new revenues are spent for the implementation of the Pover-
ty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)—that is, if they benefit the social
sectors and/or rural development—the reforms could be pro-poor. In oth-
er words, to analyze the potential effect of tax reform, it is important to
look at the potential benefit incidence of the additional spending imple-
mented with the additional tax revenues. There is a large body of litera-
ture on the benefit incidence of various types of subsidies (among others,
see Grosh 1994; Subbarao et al. 1997; Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott
2004; Komives et al. 2005). Here we conduct a very simple indicative
analysis of how additional tax revenues could benefit the poor if the rev-
enues were spent in various areas, assuming that any increase in spending
would have a benefit incidence similar to that of existing spending in any
given area. (As noted by Lanjouw and Ravallion [1999] and Ajwad and
Wodon [2007], that assumption might not be the case in practice.) 
The analysis is illustrated in figure 11.1 and in table 11.6 (on which
most of the data displayed in figure 11.1 are based). Three indicators are
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represented in the figure: the share of the poor who benefit from public
spending (or pay taxes), on the vertical axis; the share of total spending
(or taxation) that benefits the poor, on the horizontal axis; and the size of
the benefits (or taxes), which is proportional to the size of the bubble—a
larger bubble indicates a larger benefit (tax). Note that although it was
straightforward to obtain (partial) benefit incidence estimates for educa-
tion, water, and electricity from the 2000 Multiple Indicators Cluster Sur-
vey (MICS), we had to make some assumptions in the case of health care.
There we computed separately the benefit incidence parameters for three
categories of care: women receiving professional prenatal care, women re-
ceiving professional care at the time of delivery, and children receiving pro-
fessional care when sick following an episode of cough or diarrhea. Then
we simply summed those three sets of data to obtain an overall estimate
of the use of health facilities by various population deciles, assuming that
the cost of providing services in various parts of the country is constant. As
will be discussed below, those assumptions certainly exaggerate the share
of the benefits of public spending accruing to poor people; and the same
is true for education, where the unit costs of providing services in poorer
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Figure 11.1. Incidence of VAT Reforms Compared with Social Sector Spending
Source: Authors’ estimates.
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
re
ac
h
 a
m
o
n
g
 t
h
e 
p
o
o
r 
(%
 o
f p
o
o
r 
w
h
o
 b
en
ef
it
 fr
o
m
 t
h
e 
so
u
rc
e)
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
targeting to the poor (% of total transfer from the source
received by the poor)
VAT reforms
perfect transfer
secondary education,recurrent costs
primary education,recurrent costs
health care,recurrent costs
electricity,
incidence
only
water,
incidence
only
(c) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
364
Ta
b
le
 1
1
.6
.
B
en
ef
it
 In
ci
d
en
ce
 A
n
al
ys
is
 fo
r 
Se
le
ct
ed
 C
at
eg
o
ri
es
 o
f P
u
b
lic
 S
p
en
d
in
g,
N
ig
er
,2
0
0
0
pe
rc
en
t
Ed
uc
at
io
n
H
ea
lth
 c
ar
e
U
til
iti
es
Sh
ar
e
Sh
ar
e
Sh
ar
e
Sh
ar
e
Sh
ar
e
of
 c
hi
ld
re
n
re
ce
iv
in
g
re
ce
iv
in
g
of
 w
om
en
of
 w
om
en
re
ce
iv
in
g
Sh
ar
e
Sh
ar
e
Sh
ar
e
pr
im
ar
y
se
co
nd
ar
y
re
ce
iv
in
g
re
ce
iv
in
g
pr
of
es
si
on
al
re
ce
iv
in
g
re
ce
iv
in
g
re
ce
iv
in
g
ed
uc
at
io
n
ed
uc
at
io
n
pr
of
es
si
on
al
pr
of
es
si
on
al
ca
re
 w
he
n 
si
ck
he
al
th
w
at
er
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
A
ss
et
s 
de
ci
le
be
ne
fit
s
be
ne
fit
s
pr
en
at
al
 c
ar
e
de
liv
er
y 
ca
re
(c
ou
gh
/d
ia
rr
he
a)
be
ne
fit
s
be
ne
fit
s
be
ne
fit
s
1
1.
94
0.
16
0.
82
0.
28
0.
18
1.
28
0.
00
0.
00
2
2.
60
0.
17
1.
06
0.
34
0.
33
1.
73
0.
06
0.
01
3
2.
41
0.
42
1.
19
0.
47
0.
33
2.
00
0.
12
0.
18
4
3.
15
0.
13
1.
41
0.
54
0.
17
2.
12
0.
22
0.
07
5
2.
84
0.
35
1.
47
0.
57
0.
34
2.
38
0.
44
0.
14
6
3.
02
0.
29
2.
04
0.
86
0.
59
3.
49
0.
55
0.
81
7
3.
50
0.
35
1.
65
0.
76
0.
52
2.
93
0.
71
1.
17
8
4.
09
0.
56
2.
06
0.
80
0.
47
3.
32
1.
08
1.
87
9
4.
39
0.
83
2.
98
1.
23
1.
05
5.
25
1.
20
1.
47
10
5.
82
1.
13
3.
59
2.
01
0.
89
6.
49
1.
76
1.
97
To
ta
l
33
.7
8
4.
40
18
.2
6
7.
86
4.
87
31
.0
0
6.
14
7.
70
C
os
t (
m
ill
io
n 
C
FA
)
23
,4
17
8,
70
0
—
—
—
14
,0
50
—
—
So
ur
ce
:A
ut
ho
rs
’e
st
im
at
es
.
N
ot
e:
—
 =
 n
ot
 a
va
ila
b
le
.B
en
ef
it 
in
ci
d
en
ce
 is
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
20
00
 M
ul
tip
le
 In
d
ic
at
or
s 
C
lu
st
er
 S
ur
ve
y,
w
ith
 c
os
ts
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
20
02
 e
st
im
at
es
 o
f r
ec
ur
re
nt
 s
p
en
d
in
g
 fo
r e
d
uc
at
io
n 
an
d
he
al
th
 c
ar
e 
us
in
g
 b
ud
g
et
 d
at
a 
an
d
 e
xe
cu
tio
n 
ra
te
s.
(c) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
and rural areas are likely to be well below those of providing services in
richer, urban areas, such as Niamey. Still, despite those weaknesses, the
analysis does provide at least a first broad snapshot of the share of the
benefits (that is, the number of beneficiaries) of social public spending
that may accrue to the poor.
Size of Various Benefits and Taxes
For education and health care, the benefits are equated to total recurrent
spending (that is, not taking into account capital expenditures that tend to
be externally funded) in 2002 in the respective sectors—namely, primary
education, secondary education, and health care as a whole. Spending on
primary education, at CFAF 23.4 billion, is about three times the size of
spending on secondary education (CFAF 8.7 billion). Health care spend-
ing is estimated at CFAF 14.05 billion.The proceeds from the VAT reform
are estimated here at roughly 0.6 percent of GDP, or about CFAF 9.1 bil-
lion.6 In comparison to the current spending for education or health care,
the increase in taxation from the VAT reform is not small—it could cover
two-thirds of the health sector budget or 40 percent of the primary edu-
cation budget. Note that for access to piped water and electricity we do
not provide spending data because no direct connection or consumption
subsidies for connected households are paid out of the budget.
Coverage
The vertical axis in figure 11.1 provides data on the share of the poor
who benefit from various types of services (or pay indirect taxes). For
benefits, the shares are low, at 26.6 percent for primary education, 2.5 per-
cent for secondary education, 21.7 percent for health care, 2.0 percent for
electricity, and 2.3 percent for piped water. All these estimates are based
on data from the MICS 2000 survey. Given that substantial progress has
been made to improve enrollment rates in education since 2000, and giv-
en that the coverage of health facilities and access to electricity and (to a
lesser extent) piped water has improved since 2000, these estimates of
the share of the poor who are likely to benefit from various types of ex-
penditure are probably below the values for 2004. For taxes, we assume
that up to 80 percent of the population could be affected, essentially be-
cause a large share of households consumes vegetable oils.
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Targeting
The horizontal axis in figure 11.1 gives the share of various types of benefits
or taxes that accrue to poor people. For simplicity, we assumed that the poor
represent 60 percent of the population (that is, the first six deciles in table
11.6). Thus, a share lower than 60 percent would mean that, in proportion
to their population size, the poor benefit less from the private transfers than
do the nonpoor. If we consider, as we did above, that 80 percent of the popu-
lation is poor, the qualitative conclusions obtained from figure 11.1 would
not be affected because all the bubbles in the figure would shift to the right,
with their relative positions on the horizontal axis remaining roughly the
same. In all cases, targeting to the poor is below 60 percent, which means that
poor people not only pay less than their population share of taxes, but also
receive less than their population share of benefits from public spending in
the social sectors. From the point of view of assessing the VAT reforms’ po-
tential redistributive impact, however, what matters is a comparison of the
incidence of taxation to that of public spending in the social sectors, assum-
ing that new tax revenues will be allocated to these sectors (or to other pri-
ority sectors of the PRSP, such as rural development). In figure 11.1, the fact
that the share of the taxes paid by the poor is lower than the share of the ben-
efits (or rather beneficiaries) in education or health care suggests that the re-
form could be pro-poor, provided that the tax revenues are fully allocated to
these sectors.This statement, however, is based on rather strong assumptions
to which we will return below. Note also in figure 11.1 that, given data on
access to water and electricity, consumption subsidies allocated to these
goods might largely benefit those who are better-off; said differently, an ap-
propriate design of subsidies or inverted block tariff structures (as in the case
of water) is important in properly targeting poor populations.
Eradicating Poverty
The large bubble in the upper right corner of figure 11.1 represents the
size of a perfectly targeted transfer necessary to eradicate poverty (the
coverage among the poor would be 100 percent, as would be the target-
ing among the poor, because the transfer would provide to each poor
household exactly what is needed to lift the household to the poverty
line). That transfer is estimated at approximately CFAF 148 billion.
When looking at the size of the different bubbles, one immediately sees
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that even pooling the resources from the various in-kind transfers to
households through public support for education and health care, and
then providing equivalent transfers in cash to households (assuming per-
fect targeting), would still supply insufficient resources to eradicate mon-
etary poverty. This is just a reminder of the magnitude of the poverty
eradication challenge in Niger; and it points up the fact that public re-
sources and transfers, by themselves, cannot replace long-term growth to
improve the population’s living standards.
There are, however, many important caveats to be mentioned about
the analysis offered above—caveats making it less likely that indirect tax
reforms would be pro-poor. The analysis illustrated in figure 11.1 suffers
from a number of weaknesses that must be highlighted and for which
more work is required before a conclusion can be reached about the im-
pact of reforms.
Upward Bias in the Estimates of Benefit Incidence Analysis
The share of public spending that reaches poor people is certainly lower
than indicated in table 11.6 and figure 11.1. First, some of the revenues
obtained from higher taxation are likely not to be used for the social sec-
tors. Second, even when revenues are used for the social sectors, only a
partial share of the spending is allocated to front-line service delivery that
benefits the poor. Third, even when funding for the social sectors reaches
villages and urban neighborhoods, the unit cost of providing services in
rural areas where most of the poor live is lower than in urban areas. For
example, because many schools in rural areas are staffed by contractual
teachers whose wages are lower than the wages of other teachers, the
share of education spending on a per student basis that benefits the poor
will be lower than that spent for the nonpoor, even if the enrollment rates
for the poor were equal to those observed for the nonpoor. This type of
effect is not captured in our analysis because we are using data on benefi-
ciaries rather than actual benefits or costs (see, for example, Wodon and
Ye [2006] concerning the effect on benefit incidence analysis of taking
into account differences in unit costs by area). The same is true for health
care services, with unit costs lower in health posts than in hospitals. To
better assess the share of social public spending actually reaching poor
people, we would need to collect more data—for example, through pub-
lic expenditure tracking surveys.
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Need to Compare Tax Instruments Apart from the 
Incidence of Taxation and Spending
For virtually any tax reform we could conclude that the reform would be
pro-poor because the share of the tax revenues paid by the poor would
be lower than the share of the benefits from public spending received by
the poor. That conclusion, therefore, should not prevent an analysis of al-
ternative ways to raise taxes so as to provide social services because some
taxes other than the VAT probably would affect the poor significantly less
than the VAT itself would affect them.
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have illustrated simple techniques to analyze the po-
tential impact of indirect tax reforms on poor people, with specific atten-
tion to Niger. The analysis first provided a review of medium-term targets
for generating public revenues in Niger, together with a description of the
current structure of tax revenues. Then we relied on household survey
data to assess the potential distributional incidence of selected reforms
that were under consideration in the country in the first few months of
2005. Finally, the exercise briefly showed how the overall effect of any tax
reform depends in part on how new tax revenues are spent.
The lessons presented in this chapter confirm that very-low-income
countries, such as Niger, face a difficult dilemma. Although those coun-
tries are trying to increase their tax revenues to fund the provision of ba-
sic services for their population, they have limited means to do so (apart
from increasing taxes on consumption goods simply because these taxes
represent a large share of total government revenues). The problem is
that a non-negligible share of consumption-related taxes is paid by poor
people, and even small changes in the price of goods following an increase
in taxation may be very difficult to absorb by a population with very low
levels of income and consumption. One way out of this dilemma would
be to raise other sources of tax revenues that do not affect the poor as
much—but it is not necessarily easy to do so.
Another lesson from our analysis is that, although estimates of tax and
benefit incidence can be obtained even when data sources are limited, it
is important to be careful in their interpretation. For example, even if the
poor are found to pay a lower share of tax revenues than the share of ben-
efits they receive from public spending on education and health care,
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there may be important caveats built into the estimates. To give one ex-
ample, the poor population’s share of the benefits from education and
health care spending may be overestimated for a range of reasons. Fur-
thermore, although some households may gain from higher taxes and
from higher social spending funded by such taxes (say, because they have
children going to schools), other households are likely to loose. Addition-
al work and more information on the allocation of tax revenues to spend-
ing categories are needed to conduct a more detailed analysis.
Notes
1. There is a substantial and sophisticated literature on the impact of marginal
tax reforms on poverty and inequality (for example, see Yitzhaki and Thirsk
1990; Yitzhaki and Slemrod 1991; Lambert 1993; Yitzhaki and Lewis 1996;
and Makdissi and Wodon 2002). Although we are aware of this literature, sim-
pler methods are often good enough to provide insights on the incidence of
taxes and transfers, and those are the methods we rely on here.
2. Also see Subbarao et al. (1997) and Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2004) for
applications of the techniques to a large number of programs.
3. The 1-2-3 survey includes three different types of modules on employment,
informal labor, and consumption that are fielded one after the other.
4. Estimates prepared by the National Statistical Institute with more recent
2005 data after this paper was written put the incidence of poverty at slightly
below 63 percent nationally.
5. Connection rates outside Niamey were low in 1995, especially among the
poor, but connection rates for electricity and water may have changed since
1995.
6. This estimate of 0.6 percent of GDP is based on IMF and government projec-
tions; in the analysis presented in the previous section, we obtained a slightly
higher value, as the total tax was estimated at 0.9 percent of consumption,
which itself accounts for about 80 percent of GDP.
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